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**FINAL REGULATORY EVALUATION,  
FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY DETERMINATION,  
AND TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

Passenger Facility Charges Program  
Amendments Pursuant to  
Public Laws 106-181, 104-264, 103-305, and 103-272

Final Rule  
(14 CFR Part 158)

**OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS  
OPERATIONS REGULATORY ANALYSIS BRANCH, APO-310**

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May 2000

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This final rule will amend 14 CFR part 158 to enable airports to apply to the FAA for approval to increase the Passenger Facility Charge from the present cap of \$3 to \$4 or \$4.50. The rule is being issued to update 14 CFR part 158 to incorporate statutory mandates enacted since 1991, including P.L. 106-181 that was enacted on April 5, 2000.

The FAA concludes that the rule is cost-beneficial. The costs associated with the mandated changes in the PFC program are not costs of the rule but are a direct result of the congressional mandate. Large and medium hub airports where one or two air carriers control more than 50 percent of passenger boardings will be required to submit a competition plan and this one-time cost to these airports is estimated at \$1.44 million. The FAA must review all applications seeking approval for any new or existing project for which a PFC above \$3 is sought and determine whether it can be reasonably expected not to be funded from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). In addition, if the increased fee is sought to finance an eligible surface transportation or terminal project at any eligible airport, the FAA must determine that the airport has made adequate provision for financing specified airside needs of the airport. In the case of medium or large hub airports applying for a PFC above \$3, the FAA must also determine that the project to be funded makes a significant contribution to specified objectives. The FAA can make these determinations from existing information. Passengers who pay the increased fee will benefit from fewer delays, increased safety, and greater competition.

The rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, nor will it constitute a barrier to international trade. The rule does not contain a federal intergovernmental or private sector mandate that exceeds \$100 million in any year, therefore, the requirement of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

## **INTRODUCTION**

This regulatory evaluation investigates the economic impact of a final rule amending part 158, Passenger Facility Charges, to reflect statutorily mandated changes in the PFC program since 1991. Primarily this rule amends part 158 to reflect the provisions of the “Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” (P.L. 108-181) enacted April 5, 2000. The rule also amends part 158 to reflect other statutory mandates enacted after the PFC program was created in 1990, which to date have been implemented in individual PFC approval actions.

In addition to the economic analysis, this regulatory evaluation contains a regulatory flexibility determination, which analyzes the economic impact of the regulatory changes on small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended. This evaluation also contains an assessment of the effect of the regulatory changes on international trade, as required by the Trade Agreement Act of 1979. Finally, this document contains an Unfunded Mandate Assessment, as required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

## **BACKGROUND**

On November 5, 1990, Congress enacted the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) that authorized public agencies to impose a PFC of \$1, \$2, or \$3 per enplaned passenger at a commercial service airport it controls. For each passenger round trip, a PFC is only collected at the first two airports and the last two enplaning airports where PFCs are imposed thus bringing the maximum charge to \$12. The statute set forth several broad objectives for the use of these funds in furthering airport development including preserving or enhancing airports’ safety, security, or capacity; reducing noise; or enhancing airline competition. The statute authorized the use of the funds for a broad array of development projects and gave airports more flexibility in the use of these funds than allowed by other major funding sources, including AIP grants.

On May 29, 1991, FAA issued a final rule (56 FR 24254) setting forth procedures for public agency applications for authority to impose PFCs, for FAA processing of such applications, for collection, handling, and remittance of PFCs by air carriers, for recordkeeping and auditing by air carriers and public agencies, for terminating PFC authority, and for reducing AIP grants apportioned to large and medium hub airports imposing a PFC. FAA's role in the project selection is limited to denying the authority to impose and use a PFC if one or more of the following conditions apply to the project: it does not meet the statutory and regulatory criteria; it does not meet at least one of the PFC objectives; it is not justified or it does not conform to other applicable requirements referenced in the PFC regulations (e.g. environmental requirements, specified implementation schedules). Minor technical amendments and corrections (56 FR 30867 and 56 FR 37127) were made in the summer of 1991.

Since collection of these fees began in 1992, PFCs have become a major funding source for the 540 commercial service airports (defined as airports with at least 2,500 passengers boarding scheduled airline flights annually) in the U.S. The Government Accounting Office has reported<sup>1</sup> PFCs were the second largest funding source for these airports in 1996, providing \$1.11 billion, or about 18 percent of their available funds. As of March 1, 2000, the FAA has approved 314 locations for the collection of PFCs for projects with a total cost of approximately \$24.7 billion.<sup>2</sup> Actual collections from calendar years 1992-1999 inclusive amount to \$7.7 billion. Some 9 percent of the total approved collections or \$2.3 billion are for the development of Denver International Airport. Excluding Denver, landside projects account for 32 percent of the approved projects, airside – 19 percent, surface access – 12 percent, and noise - 7 percent; interest payments account for some 30 percent of the total projects approved (excluding Denver International).

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<sup>1</sup> "PASSENGER FACILITY CHARGES" GAO/RCED-99-138, page 33

<sup>2</sup> More than 200 eligible airports of all classes have elected not to impose PFCs for a variety of reasons but small airports have the lowest participation rate. This may be attributable to the low PFC revenues their traffic base would generate.

Large hubs (airports that enplane at least 1 percent of all US passengers) account for \$17.1 billion or some 69 percent of the total authorized collections of \$24.7 billion. Medium hubs (airports that enplane between 0.25 percent and 0.99 percent of all US passengers) are authorized to collect \$4.9 billion or some 20 percent of the total while small hubs (enplane at least 0.05 percent but less than .25 percent) are authorized to collect \$2.1 billion. All other authorized airports account for \$600 million.

### **Current Developments**

On April 5, 2000, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century was enacted. Section 105 of the law amended the Passenger Facility Charge program to allow the imposition of a \$4 or \$4.50 fee on each paying passenger if the Secretary finds that any project proposed at the higher level cannot be paid for from funds reasonably expected to be available from the Airport Improvement Program, and in the case of a surface transportation or terminal project, if the airport has made adequate provision for financing the airside needs of the airport, including runways, taxiways, aprons, and aircraft gates. For large and medium hubs, the legislation further requires a finding that the projects, for which a fee of \$4 or \$4.50 is sought, make a significant contribution to improve air safety and security, to increase competition among air carriers, to reduce current or anticipated congestion, or to reduce the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airport. PFCs previously could only be imposed at the \$1, \$2, or \$3 level per passenger.

Section 155 of the legislation requires large and medium hub airports, at which one or two air carriers control more than 50 percent of the passenger boardings, to submit a competition plan beginning in fiscal year 2001. Submission of this plan is mandatory in that no PFC authority or AIP grant may be approved by the FAA without a conforming

plan. This section specifies the content of the plan and directs the Secretary to review the plan submitted to ensure it meets the requirements and to periodically review its implementation.

Section 135 of the legislation makes several technical amendments including prohibiting the imposition of PFCs on flights, including flight segments, between 2 or more points in Hawaii, and in Alaska aboard an aircraft having a seating capacity of less than 60 passengers. This section also expands an airport's ability to waive the PFC in certain circumstances by adding the option of waiving PFCs on service to airports in isolated communities.

The legislation also makes several other specific changes to the PFC program including special rules for transitioning airports and changes in an airport status. These changes do not affect the FAA approval process.

## **IMPACT ON AIR PASSENGERS**

An increase in the PFC level is permitted by statute. Neither the existing rule nor the current amendments require the imposition of passenger facility charges. A decision to impose PFCs' is a voluntary action by individual airports. Nevertheless, we have analyzed the impact for information purposes.

The revenue resulting from increasing the PFC from \$3 (all but one current PFC fee is at the \$3 level) to \$4 or \$4.50 will come from air travelers using airports that elect to impose the higher fee level. The PFC fee per passenger, per round trip, cannot exceed \$18, a \$6 increase over the existing maximum. The average one-way passenger fare system-wide in 1999 was estimated<sup>3</sup> to be \$132.05. A \$1.50 increase in the PFC would raise the average fare on non-stop flights by 1.1 percent but if the one-way trip required a change of planes an additional \$1.50 could be collected and raise the average one-way fare on those trips by 2.3 percent.

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<sup>3</sup> Derived from Table 6 , FAA Aerospace Forecasts, March 2000

The Government Accounting Office report referenced earlier suggested that a \$1 increase in the PFC, if applied by all participating airports, would reduce passenger levels by 0.5 to 1.8 percent, with a midrange estimate of 0.85 percent. The GAO model used to make these estimates was based in part on a 1995 FAA analysis. The FAA has not undertaken additional analyses of this issue. In view of the many variables involved, the FAA is not making any estimate of the potential traffic loss, but the FAA believes the midrange estimate is the more likely outcome. In addition, the improvements to airport infrastructure financed with PFC funds may, in time, be expected to improve the quality of air travel to air passengers in a manner that offsets, or more than offsets, the price effect of a PFC increase.

The PFC is essentially a user fee on air passengers intended by Congress to finance needed airport infrastructure. The amount of funds made available by the PFC increase depends on the number and cost of projects funded by the increased PFC. If all PFC-eligible airports were to impose a \$4.50 PFC, annual PFC collections in the aggregate could increase by approximately \$1 billion, based on 1998 enplanements. However, since many eligible airports have not elected to impose a PFC, and since approximately 10 percent of enplanements are exempt (frequent flyers and other non-revenue passengers) the FAA estimates that the amount that could be raised by all existing PFC-imposing airports would be approximately \$ 750 million. The FAA has no reliable means to ascertain how much of the revenue raised from passengers through a higher PFC would otherwise have been raised through non-PFC sources, although a net increase in revenue is expected. The FAA notes that non-PFC revenue sources are largely derived from ticket taxes, and other airport charges otherwise paid directly or indirectly by air passengers.

The provision of the law requiring an FAA finding that an airport has made adequate arrangements for financing the airside needs of the airport before approving any surface transportation or terminal project, for which a fee of more than \$3 is sought, may contribute to reducing airside ground (gate, taxi-in and taxi-out) delays, thus benefiting air travelers. However, because this requirement is statutory and not the result of this

regulation and because the delay reduction resulting from the requirement cannot be reliably predicted, we have not attempted to quantify the delay reduction benefits associated with this requirement.

The new provision in the law requiring large and medium hubs to submit and implement competition plans will also benefit air travelers. An FAA/OST Task Force October 1999 report<sup>4</sup>, concluded:

“Airport business practices do affect airline competition, and some airport officials are adopting new business practices to promote airline competition in their communities. Indeed, a pro-competitive management philosophy, an interest by community leaders in promoting airline competition, and a commitment by airport officials to use the tools available to assist new entrant and smaller air carriers can result in a more competitive airline marketplace and generate substantial benefits to the public.”

The report cites the experience of Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) whose management pursued competitive policies that resulted in significant benefits to its passengers. Average airfares in markets served from BWI, adjusted for inflation, declined between 35 and 49 percent, depending on the length of the trip.

The new provisions may also increase local community support for airports. If the increased PFC is used by large and medium hubs to fund projects to reduce the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airports, these community residents may lessen their opposition to airside improvement projects and increased air carrier activity, which will benefit air travelers.

Finally, it should be noted that while an airport will be able to collect more revenue than it can now, and thus fund more projects the PFC revenue collected cannot exceed the cost of the approved PFC projects.

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<sup>4</sup> Airport Business Practices and Their Impact On Airline Competition, FAA/OST Task Force, October 1999 page 69. See page 71 for BWI information.

## **COSTS**

Changes in PFC program application and administrative procedures reflected in the current amendment are limited to only what has been specified by statute. Accordingly, these application and administrative costs are not costs of the rule per se but costs attributable to the congressional amendments made to the PFC program. The rate of collection and, the number of projects funded under the provisions of this amendment are not subject to the FAA's discretion but rather depends on the decisions of individual airport operators. If a project meets the statutory criteria for approval, the FAA must approve the project under the law.

### *Costs to Large and Medium Hubs*

Section 105(a) of the legislation mandates that a project for a medium or large airport is only eligible for PFC funding at the \$4 or \$4.50 levels if the project will make a significant contribution to improving air safety and security, increasing competition among air carriers, reducing current or anticipated congestion, or reducing the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airport. The FAA believes that it can make these determinations on a case-by-case basis through the analysis of data currently required to be filed by public agencies as part of the existing PFC and other FAA airports programs, although a public agency may, in some instances, voluntarily supplement project justifications to support the FAA's decision making process.

Section 155 of the legislation requires large and medium hub airports, at which one or two air carriers control more than 50 percent of the passenger boardings, to submit a competition plan beginning in fiscal year 2001. This section states that no PFC may be approved nor any AIP grant may be made unless the airport has submitted the plan. The legislation also specifies the content of the plan. It shall include information on:

- the availability of airport gates and related facilities;
- leasing and sub-leasing arrangements;
- gate-use requirements;

- patterns of air service;
- gate-assignment policy;
- financial constraints;
- airport controls over air- and ground-side capacity;
- whether the airport intends to build or acquire gates that could be used as common facilities; and
- airfare levels (as compiled by the Department of Transportation) compared to other large airports.

Virtually all large and medium hub airports already have most of this information available (except the last item, which they are not, in any event, required to compile). The FAA estimates<sup>5</sup> that the cost of preparing the required competition plan will be \$30,000 per airport authority. The FAA, based on passenger enplanements for 1998, determined that there are 41 large and medium hubs where one or two air carriers control more than 50 percent of the passenger boardings.<sup>6</sup> Thus the one-time cost to the industry is estimated to be \$1,440,000. Since this cost is required by a provision of the law, and in any case must be incurred by airports applying to receive AIP funds (a larger number of airports than the number that participate in the PFC program) it is not a cost of this final rule. Furthermore, application costs are recoverable under the provisions of the existing rule and, therefore, the cost of the study will be recaptured.

### Costs to All Airports

Section 105 of the law requires that if a higher than \$3 PFC level is sought for any otherwise-approvable PFC project the FAA must make a determination that:

- the project cannot be paid for from funds reasonably expected to be available from the AIP program; and

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<sup>5</sup> Based on 15 days of consultants time (1 senior executive @\$1,000 per day and 1 senior associate @ \$600 per day) plus expenses (Computer reports, clerical, communications, graphics, reproduction, and travel).

<sup>6</sup> The airports are listed in Appendix A.

- if it is a surface transportation or terminal project, the public agency has made adequate provision for financing airside needs of the airport, including runways, taxiways, aprons, and airport gates.

The FAA believes that it can make these determinations through the analysis of financing and capital improvement plan data currently required to be filed by public agencies as part of the existing PFC and other FAA airports programs. In particular, the FAA may review the public agency's Capital Improvement Plan, the airport layout plan, master plans or other planning documents, the FAA's airport certification inspection reports, or similar documents as part of its analysis. While this information is currently required, public agencies may incur some extra expense to further ensure the accuracy, timeliness and completeness of the documents. The FAA estimates that these expenses would be de minimis. Furthermore, application costs are recoverable under the provisions of the existing rule and, therefore, any additional application costs will be recaptured.

#### Collection Costs

Air carriers are responsible for the collection, handling and remittance of PFC revenues. Increasing the permissible amount of the PFC may require some computer reprogramming costs and higher credit card fees for the carriers. This is a direct cost of the law and, therefore, not a cost of the rule. Under section 158.53 of the existing rule, carriers are compensated for handling PFCs through the retention of a fixed fee per PFC plus earnings on the revenue "float" for the PFCs that they collect. The FAA has been directed by Congress (House Report 106-513) to prescribe new regulations that establish the portion of a PFC which the airlines may retain to compensate their necessary and reasonable expenses in collecting and handling PFC funds. This effort will enable the FAA to adjust handling fees, if necessary, to appropriately compensate average costs to air carriers of collecting and handling the fees.

## **BENEFITS**

As described earlier, air travelers are the primary beneficiaries of construction projects funded by the expanded PFC program. Also noise-impacted residents living near airports will benefit from projects to reduce noise impacts. In addition, small airports will receive additional AIP funding diverted from large and medium hub airports as a result of the amended law.

Section 105(e)(1) of the law specifies that in the case of a PFC fee of more than \$3, the apportionment monies (so-called entitlement funds) of large and medium hub airports under the AIP program will be reduced by 75 percent. This compares to the current 50 percent reduction of these funds in the case of a fee of \$3 or less. If all large and medium hubs that currently impose a PFC were to increase their fees to \$4.50, the extra 25 percent of apportionment funds (the difference between the current 50 percent reduction and the new reduction rate of 75percent) would generate an estimated additional \$72 million in funds for distribution to small airports beginning in Fiscal Year 2002<sup>7</sup>. Under the law, the released funds are allocated as follows: 25 percent for a discretionary fund (from *which* small hub airports are allocated 50 percent of this amount) and 75 percent for a Small Airports Fund for use by public use general aviation airports and nonhub commercial service airports. Small airports are a significant element of the national air transportation system and account for about 3.4 percent of all enplanements. In addition, there are some 334 small airports (which may be funded from the Small Airport Fund) that are designated as "reliever" airports, which provide an alternative for general

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<sup>7</sup> Based on existing apportionment formulas, large and medium airports currently collecting PFCs will return \$164 million in AIP entitlement funds in FY 2000. If all such airports imposed a greater than \$3PFC (based on FY 2000 apportioned funds), another \$82 million in AIP would be returned, of which 87.5 percent (or \$72 million) would be allocated to small hub, nonhub, and general aviation airports. The FAA expects that the \$72 million in returned apportioned AIP funds will be available in FY2002 because the higher PFC level will not begin until FY 2001 for many airports. Section 104 of P.L. 106-181 provides that entitlements in FY 2001 through FY 2003 shall be doubled when AIP funding is \$3.2 billion or more, although any given airport is subject to a \$26 million cap (which will effect the 5 largest hub airports). Thus, the amount of released funds to small airports could be approximately double the amount noted above in FY 2002 and 2003.

aviation operators to congested hub airports. Improving their facilities may increase the diversion of general aviation operators from hub airports and thus possibly lessen delays for hub airport air travelers who pay PFC charges.

## **SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS**

This final rule amends part 158 to be consistent with current statutes governing the PFC program. These new statutory provisions will enable airport authorities to increase the PFC in order to collect more funds for enhancing the safety, security and capacity of their facilities; reducing noise in nearby communities; and enhancing airline competition to the benefit of air travelers. The FAA estimates that up to \$750 million annually in PFC funds will be made available to airports to make these improvements. As a result of the higher percentage of returned AIP apportioned funds attributable to these higher PFC collections, an additional \$72 million in AIP funding could be available to small airports by FY 2002. Under the provisions of the statute, this amount would be almost doubled through FY2003 if AIP funds are appropriated at \$3.2 billion or more. Some air travelers will incur a small increase (1-2 percent) in the cost of their ticket to obtain these benefits although over the long run these passengers will receive compensating benefits from improved infrastructure financed with the higher PFC funds. These costs reflect the voluntary action of airports and are not required either by statute or the current amendment to the rule. The costs of implementing the mandated changes in the PFC program application and administrative procedures are costs attributable to the statute and are not costs of this rule.

## **REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY DETERMINATION**

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 establishes “as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.” To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals

and to explain the rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) as described in the Act.

However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that the head of the agency may so certify and an RFA is not required. The certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.

The FAA has determined that this final rule imposes no costs or benefits on small commercial service airports. This rule is limited to only what has been authorized by statute. Moreover, all costs are fully recoverable through the PFC. Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.

## **INTERNATIONAL TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. In addition, consistent with the Administration's belief in the general superiority and desirability of free trade, it is the policy of the Administration to remove or diminish to the extent feasible, barriers to

international trade, including both barriers affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign countries and barriers affecting the import of foreign goods and services into the United States.

In accordance with the above statute and policy, the FAA has assessed the potential affect of this final rule and has determined that it will impose the same costs on domestic and international entities for comparable services and thus has a neutral trade impact.

## **UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT ASSESSMENT**

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) codified in 2 U.S.C., 1501-1571, requires each Federal agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of \$100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal governments on a proposed “significant intergovernmental mandate.” A “significant intergovernmental mandate” under the Act is any provision in a Federal agency regulation that would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, of \$100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development of regulatory proposals.

This final rule does not contain a Federal intergovernmental or private sector mandate that exceeds \$100 million a year. While PFC collections are likely to increase by at least \$100 million per year, the rule is not the cause of that impact but the statute that permits

the increase in the maximum PFC level. The increase will be triggered by the decisions of individual public agencies to seek the increase and not by any action of the federal government. If a project meets the statutory criteria for approval, the FAA must approve the project. Moreover, any increase costs associated with obtaining approval to impose the higher fee are fully recoverable through PFC funding.

## APPENDIX A

### Large and Medium Hubs at which 1 or 2 Air Carriers Control more than 50% of Passenger Boardings

#### LARGE HUBS

Atlanta, GA  
Baltimore, MD  
Charlotte, NC  
Chicago, IL (O'Hare)  
Covington, KY  
(Cincinnati, OH)  
Dallas/Fort Worth, TX  
Denver, CO  
Detroit, MI  
Houston, TX (Bush  
Intercontinental)  
Loudon, VA  
(Washington Dulles)  
Miami, FL  
Minneapolis, MN  
Newark, NJ  
Philadelphia, PA  
Phoenix, AZ  
Pittsburgh, PA  
Salt Lake City, UT  
San Francisco, CA  
St. Louis, MO

#### MEDIUM HUBS

Albuquerque, NM  
Austin, TX  
Burbank, CA  
Chicago, IL (Midway)  
Cleveland, OH  
Dallas, TX (Love Field)  
El Paso, TX  
Houston, TX (Hobby)  
Jacksonville, FL  
Kahului, HI  
Louisville, KY  
Memphis, TN  
Nashville, TN  
Oakland, CA  
Ontario, CA  
Providence, RI  
Reno, NV  
Sacramento, CA  
San Antonio, TX  
San Jose, CA  
San Juan, PR  
West Palm Beach, FL

Source: DOT/FAA "Air Carrier Activity Information System" database for CY 1998